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W h a t I p lan to do in this essay is not u n i q u e in manner or method 
in studies of the culture of American cities, b u t has not been done often, 
and it certainly has never been done about Seattle. Like most cities, 
Seattle has been studied extensively, mostly by local journalists and by 
students in one or another of the social sciences. T h e strengths and 
weaknesses of work done by such people are well enough known to need 
no rehearsing here. Although in writing what follows I have drawn exten-
sively from the work these people have done, my aims and methods are 
generally qui te different from theirs. I want to try to "read" a city during 
one of its critical periods. T h e criteria one uses to define a "critical 
per iod" are not easily described or analyzed; the methods one uses to 
"read" a city are not easily capable of theoretical defense. I t is hard 
enough to know what one's data are when trying to imagine the life of 
any city at any poin t in time; it is harder still to say exactly how one 
decides from the available data just what is important . One has, to be 
sure, evidence aplenty, and a good deal of i t is solid. But reading the 
evidence, making it make sense, letting it be itself and yet also shaping 
it into a "history" that makes clear what the "crisis" is—that is another 
story. All kinds of things are happening in a city at any given moment, 
and if you take one activity at a time—making and losing money, building 
roads and parks, responding to national or internat ional circumstances, 
developing or re tarding means for social mobili ty or economic diversity, 
creating or stultifying "cultural awareness"—each is not so very hard to 
describe. If, however, one tries to imagine all these things happening at 
once, and if one knows that the life of a city cannot be apprehended when 
all tha t is happen ing is sorted out into convenient categories, then some 
kind of focus must be found which does some kind of justice to at least 
the major separate activities and which also brings them together into 
some kind of unified "life." We believe this can be done with the life of 
a m a n or of a country; these are the major tasks of biographers and his-
29 
torians. But very seldom does anyone try to tell the history of a city, even 
dur ing a relatively short period, in this way. 
T h e method involved is of necessity imperfect. One must not only 
identify those people or facts or events which seem the most important , 
b u t one must also recognize that the past from which these came and the 
future toward which they were tending can be described in a single essay 
only very briefly. T h e crisis with which I am concerned here is Seattle's 
experience during the war and its aftermath, the General Strike of 1919. 
Even to begin to try to br ing these into focus is to be forced back in time 
to events in Seattle before the war and out in space to the nat ional and 
internat ional scene. Of necessity everything begins to connect with every-
thing else: the war with prohibi t ion; prohibi t ion wi th labor and labor 
unions; labor unions with radicalism; and all these with local circum-
stances which make the general experience of the country unique in each 
of its provincial manifestations. 
T o try to weave all these together in to a coherent account means that 
n o one element in the story can be handled as it might be if one were 
considering it alone. T h e biographer of Woodrow Wilson, the historian 
of American labor, the experience of various Seattle newspapers, the 
memory of Anna Louise Strong—all these must be drawn from and made 
par t of the story even as one recognizes that one is thereby not doing full 
justice to any one. T h e potential rewards, however, for the historian of 
a city are very great, if he sees his task well. Instead of seeing everything 
primarily in relation to itself, one can begin to see, by relating various 
things within a city, a good deal about each individual item that might 
otherwise be missed. T h e war did not happen separately from prohi-
bition, and the I.W.W. did not happen separately from either, and all 
these happened in individual places. T h e historian of a city uses the 
place as his uni t of consideration and tries to see how everything else fits. 
Thus , though no separate element is done full justice, each can begin to 
be seen differently from the way we saw them before the city historian 
began his "reading." 
# # # 
It is not easy to talk about a nat ional war in the context of a city, yet 
it is impossible to talk well about Seattle in 1914-1919 without reference 
to World W a r I. W e have long known that this war was a European 
disaster perhaps unequal led in history; it is only more recently that we 
have seen how it wras a disaster for the Uni ted States as well. I t is now 
accepted as a fact, though only one among many, tha t the radicals in this 
country were right: " W h a t the Spanish W a r began," wrote one, " the 
World W a r accomplished. America became the world's banker, and 
ceased to be the world's p ioneer ." 1 T h a t is what happened , though it is 
not clear that even those most instrumental in effecting the change in 
America's position were aware at the time that they were doing so. 
Between 1914 and 1917 America was gradually and reluctantly pul led 
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into the war, and this gradual pul l ing, as opposed to a sudden and de-
cisive entry, effected profoundly the way the people thought about 
themselves. 
In 1914 President Wilson wanted nothing so much as to be able to 
concentrate on domestic and progressive politics and reform, and public 
opinion was generally ignorant of the warring Europeans; if Americans 
expressed much of an opinion abou t the war, it was that this country was 
above such things. W h a t neither the United States nor the European 
countries had counted on was the effect of a vastly increased industrial 
capacity, developed since the Napoleonic wars, on the nature of war itself. 
When it began to dawn on the British and the French just how much 
they had committed themselves to in the way of men and munit ions, they 
realized that they had to turn to America for money and supplies. T h e 
United States proclaimed its neutrali ty, and behind that policy lay a real 
desire to be peaceful, bu t neutrali ty did not remain possible for long. 
Secretary of State Wil l iam Jennings Bryan, reflecting the public mood of 
the Midwest and Far West, resisted the efforts of eastern bankers to loan 
money to the Allies, but Bryan was out of place in Washington, where 
Wilson, Undersecretary Rober t Lansing, Colonel House and many others 
were convinced that America could stay neutral while eastern businesses 
and banks supported the Allies. Th is conviction was of course unrealistic, 
because the moment American ships entered the war zone Germany either 
had to attack them with submarines or else watch herself be defeated 
slowly by the decisive weight of American industrial and financial might. 
Dur ing 1914 and 1915 neither the flow of men and munit ions nor the 
amount of American shipping was enough to warrant direct belligerency 
by the Germans. Bu t after the terrible summer campaigns of 1916 both 
Allied demand for more American help and staggering German losses 
forced the Germans to see that a Uni ted States supplying the Allies un-
molested and a Uni ted States at war with Germany were sufficiently the 
same thing to warrant all-out submarine warfare; it seemed to them a 
reasonable, if desperate, remedy. W h e n the Germans began their U-Boat 
attacks, Woodrow Wilson asked Congress for a Declaration of War . 
T h e trouble was that the Uni ted States could not simply argue that it 
was going to war because its ships were being attacked in the war zone, 
because to do that would raise the question of why the American ships 
had to be in the war zone in the first place. Instead Wilson had to argue 
that we were as high-minded in going to war as we had been in staying 
out. So we were to fight "the war to end war," which could only mean 
that we in tended to pu t the Europeans in their place once and for all; we 
would "make the world safe for democracy," which meant that not only 
would we pu t the Europeans in their place but would dictate their 
political systems for them as well. In other words, in order to justify 
what it in tended to do, the Uni ted States had to ignore a good deal of 
what it had done, and to distort a good many of the facts of its own and 
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the surrounding world. As we will see, partly for local reasons and partly 
because it was inevitably drawn into the national experience, Seattle was 
beginning to do exactly the same thing. 
# * # 
Dur ing the winter of 1917, when the United States was being told to 
prepare itself for war (even before President Wilson, who had been re-
elected because "he had kept us out of war," had his second inaugural) , 
there were two big items in the news in Seattle: the trial of the mayor, 
H i r am Gill, on grounds of conspiring with a bootlegger, Logan Bil-
lingsley, and the trial of T o m Tracy, one of seventy-six Wobblies who had 
been charged with murde r after the shoot-out known as "the Everett 
Massacre" the previous November. Fortunately these two trials can tell 
us a great deal about Seattle on the verge of war, and what happened to 
the local press as it handled these trials in the context of the coming war. 
T h e most interesting of the local newspapers for our purposes is the 
Seattle Star,, an afternoon Scripps tabloid that h a d grown in the previous 
ten years from the city's " th i rd" and "class-conscious" paper (behind the 
staid and respectable. Post-Intelligencer and the middle class, would-be 
respectable, often hysterical Times) to become Seattle's most popu la r 
paper; the Star had a circulation of about 67,000 in 1917, impressive for a 
paper which did not publish on Sunday in a city of about 300,000. I t had 
grown from a sheet of six to eight pages, most of them filled with features 
syndicated by the Scripps chain, to something like a genuine newspaper 
of as many as twenty pages, with a good many of the stories wri t ten by 
local people. Its editorial policy was progressive in tone. I t had sup-
ported all campaigns for municipal ownership of the natural monopolies, 
it was in favor of prohibi t ion, it was pro-labor wi thout being really anti-
business, and it tended, as tabloids will, to encourage its readers to take 
sides without ever really trying to educate them. Its audience, one pre-
sumes, was primarily that segment of the working class which was becom-
ing, or trying to become, more settled, more respectable, more oriented to 
the newly-popular movie houses than to the older bu t now disreputable 
saloons. Back in 1913 the Star had supported the Dry and reform candi-
date, George Cotterill, for mayor, though it did not strongly oppose 
Hiram Gill, who was a staunch Wet and who claimed also to be for 
reform. By 1917, however, after the state of Washington had voted itself 
first anti-saloon and then anti-drink, the Star was as staunchly opposed to 
the mayor as were the older and more respectable papers. Dur ing the 
winter of 1917 it moved back and forth in its banners from hoot ing at the 
mayor, whose credentials as a reforming Dry i t had never quite believed, 
to shrieking at the people to get ready for the noble and just war that 
America was about to enter. 
Wha t makes the Star interesting is not just that i t was shifting its 
political bearings towards super-patriotism bu t tha t it still showed some 
of its older and more responsible bearings now and then. Thus , though it 
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began on February 7 to carry STAND BY T H E P R E S I D E N T across the 
top of its editorial page, and though on the 13th its only headline read 
P R E P A R E , it could still denounce legislation offered in the City Council 
that made flag ceremonials mandatory on all public occasions. Thus , 
though it could enter eagerly into the Mad H a t t e r logic of "War between 
the Uni ted States and Germany would spell peace for the world," it could 
report the trial of the Wobblies charged wi th murde r during the Everett 
Massacre fairly well and always dispassionately. But in March, when the 
mayor, Gill, went on trial, it had to report tha t story, the Wobbly story, 
and the war news all at once, and it began to lose its head, apparently 
basing its layout on the principle "the last shall be first": the Wobbly 
trial was relegated to the back pages, the war news took second place, and 
the booze scandal trial dominated. T h e Gill trial was the kind of farce 
that is almost inevitable when a cause like Prohibi t ion grips the people, 
and unfortunately the Star couldn't even admi t it was a farce without 
seeming to favor mayor Gill and l iquor. For a week the bootlegger, 
Logan Billingsley, bathed himself in confessions: he did sell booze, he 
had been wanted for murder back in Oklahoma though he wasn't guilty, 
he had br ibed Gill and the Chief of Police to gain official support for his 
bootlegging. T h e Star reported all this gleefully, and didn' t act for a 
minute as though Gill could get out of this one. There was even the 
added implicat ion of guilt because George Vanderveer, Billingsley's law-
yer and allegedly in on the conspiracy, was at tha t moment defending the 
Wobblies in the Everett trial. However, i t d idn ' t take Gill's lawyer very 
long to topple the whole story: Billingsley was trying to frame Gill, was 
trying to bribe witnesses, was giving $1000 to the fire-eating prohibitionist 
minister, Rev. Mark Mathews, to open a vice campaign against Gill. I t 
took the jury only a few hours to find Gill no t guilty, and the Star3 which 
had acted r ight u p to the point of the verdict as though of course Gill was 
guilty, had to drop the case as though it h a d never happened, and switch 
suddenly from booze to war. Fortunately for the paper Wilson asked 
Congress to declare war just two days after the Gill verdict and the Star 
could begin to whoop it u p : "Today, in this land of ours, there are only 
two classes of people. One class consists of Americans. These will stand 
solidly behind President Wilson. All others are T R A I T O R S . " 
On the same day, Apri l 4, George Vanderveer was opening his defense 
of T o m Tracy in the Wobbly case, and all the papers almost ignored it. 
T h e Star was not yet so hysterical that it was going to make the same mis-
take here that it did with Gill; it put the story on the back pages, did not 
denounce all Wobblies as traitors, and remained detached whenever it 
did run a story on the trial in ensuing days. But that this was not only 
the longest criminal trial to date in King County but also one of the most 
exciting and most impor tant was something none of the major papers 
could realize or would countenance. W h a t even the Star could not hide 
was that the Wobblies, though clearly not "s tanding behind the Presi-
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d e n t / ' were going to win, and that the sheriff of Snohomish County and 
his deputies, who clearly were "standing behind the President," had been 
responsible for a good deal of bloodshed, a great number of beatings and 
at least half a dozen deaths. T h e story of the Everett Massacre need not 
be told here; Norman Clark's history of Everett, Mill Town (Seattle, 
1970) is the fullest account, though almost all histories of the I .W.W. 
include some telling of the tale. Wha t we learn from the Star is that 
Vanderveer produced many witnesses about whom no bias could be al-
leged and who said that deputies on the dock in Everett had taken pot-
shots at unarmed men who had jumped off the Verona after the ship had 
docked and the deputies had opened fire. But the Star felt it could not 
report the following, which came out as the prosecutor was trying to shake 
a defense witness. T h e prosecutor tried to get the witness to say there 
were cartridges and weapons aboard the Verona after i t had left Everett 
and re turned to Seattle. H e got nowhere. 
Prosecutor; Didn ' t you pick up anything at all from the 
deck? 
Witness: I picked u p an eye. A man's eye. 2 
After a number of such incidents, it was no longer surprising that Tracy 
and the Wobblies were quickly acquitted, and by a jury carefully picked 
to exclude any who felt any ideological sympathy for the I.W.W. cause. 
Even after the trial was over, and "forgotten" as the Gill case had 
been, the Star still was not free to envisage a country uni ted in its loath-
ing of German mili tarism and its support of the President; the evidence 
that people in Seattle were divided kept cropping u p . T h e Star could 
flatly assert that support for the war was so strong that all the soldiers the 
country needed could be drawn from enlistments, b u t when that proved 
palpably false it was forced to support the country's first conscription law 
and to shout S E D I T I O N ! when Socialists Hu le t Wells and Sam Sadler 
were arrested for opposing the law. I t could proclaim in a headline that 
Seattle's businessmen were all for conscripting profits as well as men, bu t 
had to admit in the ensuing story that the businessmen it interviewed 
were saying that of course they wanted to support the war effort bu t that 
they would strongly oppose anything so radical as an excess profits tax. 
T h e Star could announce that all rank-and-file working men, unlike the 
Wobblies and the Socialists, were solidly behind the war, but it could not 
avoid report ing strike after strike, in the lumber camps, in the shipyards, 
in the packing plants, in the offices of the telephone company. I t found 
Wells and Sadler guilty before their trial began, bu t then had to report 
that the judge threw out three of the five charges and that the jury was 
h u n g on the other two. It could print a page of a textbook called Im 
Vaterland that was used in Seattle's schools and insist that it be with-
drawn, then had to say that the school board members found little wrong 
with the book, though continued pressure from the Star did force the 
board to withdraw it "temporarily in the interest of preserving tran-
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quirky." W h a t all these stories show is that the vestige of all that had 
been rather good about the Star kep t forcing it to contradict itself. 
T h r o u g h the summer of 1917, the radicals h a d consistently been chal-
lenged and equally consistently h a d been able to demonstrate the folly 
and even the perfidy of their challengers. News of the Everett Massacre 
and the trial did a great deal to he lp the I .W.W. gather support through-
out the Northwest, and it was also beginning to shift its program from 
agitation and reform to something more revolutionary, though the Wob-
blies almost never advocated anyth ing as wild as the opposition claimed. 
As the country's industrial migh t was trying to mobilize fully, the exist-
ence of the Wobblies became more and more an outrage to the respect-
able. On November 15, fourteen Wobbl ies were arrested in a bunkhouse 
at Camp Lewis, just south of Tacoma; the " incr iminat ing evidence" the 
Star said was found consisted of no th ing more than "newspaper clippings, 
private and confidential correspondence, a n d extracts from radical pub-
lications." T w o days later a headl ine ran " B A R E G E R M A N P L O T A T 
CAMP LEWIS ," which of course was not true, as the story showed: "The 
officials here have been working for months to connect German spies with 
vice conditions in Seattle . . . and secret service agents have spent weeks 
gathering evidence to show tha t the I .W.W. is inspired by German capi-
tal ." So there was no plot, only an effort to prove one. But all this clown-
ing, by the government as well as the Star, was concealing something 
grimmer. O n December 10 a lawyer who needed one of the Wobblies 
arrested at Camp Lewis in ano ther case found his man in jail and asked 
him with what he had been charged. W i t h nothing, it turned out. T h e 
men were simply being incarcerated, the G e r m a n plot and the private 
and confidential correspondence presumably having come to about what 
one would have expected. T h e lawyer got all fourteen out on a habeas 
corpus writ, bu t it is not fun to contemplate wha t would have happened 
to the men had the lawyer no t come along. 
T h e n there was Anna Louise Strong, who became the arch-traitor for 
the respectable because she h a d deserted not only her country, but her 
class. She had come to Seattle wi th her father i n 1912; he was minister of 
the Queen Anne Congregational Church; she was a social worker; she had 
a doctorate from the University of Chicago; she had written a number of 
books, including an expansion of her dissertation, The Psychology of 
Prayer. I n 1913 the two h a d gone to J a p a n to study working conditions 
there; they re turned to Seattle in 1915, a n d shortly thereafter Anna 
Strong ran for the School Board. H e r credentials were both respectable 
and progressive, and she was herself young, vigorous and attractive. She 
won easily. But the job proved merely onerous, because if the "interests" 
she had dedicated herself to fighting were be ing served by the endless 
awarding of contracts for rewir ing or a new playground, she had no way 
to find out, and the whole scale of the operations seemed too petty to 
matter. Slowly she found herself moving, in effect, down off old, estab-
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lished, respectable Queen Anne Hil l into lower downtown, the h a u n t of 
the more radical. She testified at both Wells-Sadler sedition trials. She 
reported the story of the Everett Massacre for the New York Evening 
Post. She sat beside Louise Olivereau, a self-confessed anarchist, while she 
was being tried and convicted for distr ibuting anti-conscription l i terature. 
She wrote stories for the only radical paper in Seattle, the Daily Call. 
Predictably, petitions began to be circulated demanding Anna Strong's 
recall from the School Board. "Yet at first they got so few signatures that 
the recall languished and almost died. A friend of mine was passing the 
recall headquarters on a prominent thoroughfare and was asked by a 
woman who had stopped to observe the placards: 'What are they re-
calling her for? Wha t has she done?' . . . 'She's against the war / said my 
friend. . . . 'My God, who isn ' t / grunted the woman, and moved on . " 3 
But that was only after the first Wells-Sadler trial. After she appeared in 
court with Louise Olivereau and after the Im Vaterland incident ( though 
she had finally voted to withdraw the textbook), the petitions began 
filling up , and by late in 1917 enough had been collected to force an 
election, which would be held along with the regular municipal election 
in March of 1918. 
Anna Strong should not have had a chance. All her old supporters, 
the various woman's clubs, temperance leagues, PTAs, the Municipal 
League, had deserted her; the three major newspapers were solidly op-
posed: "It is sufficient for loyal Americans to know that she is an un-
yielding pacifist/' said the Star, "Wi th connections of that kind, her place 
as a public official is inconsistent with American aims and purposes." T h e 
Star, it will be noted, was discovering what the Seattle Times had dis-
covered earlier: when in doubt , use the word "American" as a bludgeon. 
T h e Union Record pr inted the names and addresses of those who had 
circulated petitions for Miss Strong's recall, and at a glance it looks as 
though the whole city was against her. But a second glance reveals that 
the majority of the addresses in the Union Record list are in what were 
then outlying residential areas, places where the Star reading, old-line 
working class or middle class people were moving. From First Hill , 
Queen Anne Hill, Capitol Hil l , Washington Park, Madrona and Mt. 
Baker Park, from those areas closer to the center of the city where people 
of considerable wealth lived, there was little activity, proving (as could 
be proved in a number of other ways, incidentally) that the affluent had 
retired from all such struggles. Nor from those working class districts 
that still showed their working class loyalties came support for the recall. 
Wha t we seem to find, then, is that the gradual movement of Anna Louise 
Strong to the left was most obviously an outrage to those patriotic and 
newly established people who could see in her an implicit threat to their 
recently acquired status, and these people received solid, though usually 
not very vocal opposition from the more securely established. 
T h e election of 1918 is not easy to decipher, though clearly the 
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patriots and good citizens won by a narrower margin than was expected. 
For mayor the leading candidate was Ole Hanson, a simple-minded for-
mer real estate operator, and in the primary the remaining vote was 
fragmented, the winner being a nondescript man named James Bradford, 
whom labor found itself support ing without much enthusiasm. T h a t 
race, and Anna Strong's recall, were the big issues. Ole Hanson saw the 
Way, the T r u t h and the Light: "My opponent is supported by every 
I.W.W., by every anti-government agitator, by every pro-German, and by 
every near-I .W.W. labor leader in the city." T h e Star' saw much in this 
rhetorical ploy: "Treason cannot be tolerated, and if we in Seattle are 
truly American, it will not be. Let not seditionists and NEAR-SEDI-
T I O N I S T S gain the least foothold." I t was worse, it would seem, to be 
almost a traitor, like Anna Strong, than to be the real thing. T r u e 
traitors, like Louise Olivereau, professed no loyalty to America and 
Americanism, and they could be easily handled by arrest and conviction. 
But Anna Strong professed great love and loyalty to America, she was 
fighting to save the country from mania, and because she had done noth-
ing with which she could be formally charged, she was more dangerous 
than a confessed traitor. She could not be called a bum, or a deportable 
foreigner, a bomb-thrower, or a Wobbly, so the only way to suppress her 
was in to insist that " T h e Real Issue is AMERICANISM" and not truth, 
justice and the American way, in all of which Anna Strong believed. 
Ole Hanson won easily, and by all rights Anna Louise Strong should 
have been repudiated, banished. "But, though no word of our side was 
pr inted for three months by any newspaper except the Seattle Daily Call, 
yet when the votes were counted, the good citizens who had expected a 
ten to one victory over a 'handful of trai tors/ won by only two thousand 
votes in a total of eighty-five thousand. They actually lost the city council 
to the 'reds' who had intelligently prepared a whole slate, while the 
patriots had emotionally concentrated on the recall and the mayor. T h e 
patriots were momentari ly crushed into silence; they were actually wor-
r ied." 4 Anna Strong is either misremembering or willfully embroidering 
the facts here, bu t most of what she says is true. Her side of the story 
could only be found in the Call, which never had a circulation of more 
than 15,000, and the good citizens obviously did expect to defeat her 
easily. But 85,000 is the number of registered voters in Seattle in 1918, 
not the number who actually voted, and the margin of her defeat was 
larger than she says: 27,157 for recall, and 21,824 against. Nor were the 
councilmen elected very red, though they were vigorously anti-establish-
ment . Still, Anna Strong was right in believing that there were splits in 
the citizenry which could not be resolved by appeals to Americanism or 
by the fear of traitors and near-traitors. "Instead of the time honored 
division between the 'progressives' and the 'interests' in which the pro-
gressives won most of the offices while the interests remained unscathed 
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in the industries, a bitter batt le ensued between 'good citizens' and the 
' reds/ " 5 
W h a t Anna Strong did not seem to realize was that she was describing 
a city getting deeper and deeper into trouble. W h a t she saw as the "t ime 
honored division" between the progressives and the "interests" really had 
not existed in Seattle more than fifteen or twenty years earlier. Seattle 
had fought ha rd to obtain municipal ownership of its natural monopolies, 
and if it did not win every fight, it did gain municipal water, electric, 
and sewer systems that were models for their age. Between 1900 and 1915, 
mostly due to the impetus of the wealthy, Seattle had acquired a first rate 
boulevard and park system, though at tha t time it was one that could be 
enjoyed mostly by those rich enough to afford an automobile. I n the 
same period most of the regrading of the downtown area had taken place. 
W h a t had happened, however, was that the huge economic growth ex-
perienced at that t ime was simply too s tunning for many people to realize 
that forces were being unleashed which should have been controlled. T h e 
wealthy began to retire to their lovely estates and roads and to let Seattle 
become an increasingly simple city economically. T h e progressives, in 
their turn, allowed themselves to become preoccupied with moral matters 
like prohibit ion, gambling and sexual habits, and to let the "interests" 
take whatever was left to be grabbed: the Great Nor the rn Railroad came 
to Seattle on its own terms and the huge piers on Harbor Island were 
allowed to be developed privately without publ ic control bu t wi th the 
help of public funds. I t was the sort of division that needed only the 
impetus of the war to become a genuine class war, with the affluent stand-
ing idly aside, the middle class becoming pious and chauvinistic and the 
left becoming the repository for old-line progressives as well as the many 
new radicals created by the rapacity of the war machine. It was a fight in 
which, invariably, both sides would lose, because each was finding more 
ways to distrust and distort the other. On the one side, dr inking or sup-
port ing Wobblies or not buying Liberty Bonds was becoming treason, 
while on the other buying a car and moving to the suburbs and reading 
the Star and being unwill ing to strike became immoral, selling out. 
Seattle was simultaneously becoming more radical, and known as a radi-
cal city, and becoming more bourgeois, graduat ing its working class into 
the middle class: it was becoming a city where people were aware of class 
and status distinctions and afraid of people no t "of one's own kind." 
Of course it is much easier to be sympathetic to the radicals, partly 
because we know their stories so much better. A m a n who found the war 
useful in gaining some kind of economic security and who used that se-
curity as a means of performing all those middle class rites he had always 
wanted to perform, like buying a house, sending his children to good 
schools, living a reasonably sober and godly life: such a man stands little 
chance of being remembered clearly precisely because we have to imagine 
him; he himself is nameless and faceless. But Anna Louise Strong, and 
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Hule t Wells and Sam Sadler, who had a grand rabble-rousing wife Kate, 
and George Vanderveer who gave up his respectability to become counsel 
for the damned, and Thorwald Mauritzen who made the Daily Call a 
success after starting with only $500 and hope—all these people have come 
down to us, gaudy and wonderful. Fur thermore , in many ways the rad-
icals' wart ime cri t ique of their city and country now seems much the best, 
because they were much more alert and probably more intelligent than 
the m a n who was gaining his small measure of economic security and who 
wanted only to enjoy it. Inevitably, as the historian of Seattle moves 
through the war years, he finds his sympathies increasingly moving left-
ward, though he must always seek to imagine and understand those who 
did not so move. 
Luckily for the historian, careful study of the rise of radicalism in 
Seattle and the Northwest does reveal more than ways of being sympa-
thetic. T h e movement itself was almost inevitable: some people were 
moving westward, restlessly and angrily, and they ended up in Seattle 
because it was the last frontier. Others were in nearby logging camps that 
did not even offer the few amenities available in grubby mill and mining 
towns farther east. Others were coming because Seattle had had a boom-
ing and reasonably progressive past not long before—in John Dos Passos' 
The 42nd Parallel one man urges another in a lumber camp to move 
west to Seattle where, he has heard, they have great free night schools. 
Others were coming to Seattle in some way defeated—they had tried to 
s tump farm on logged-off land and kept seeing the wilderness return, or 
had tried to dry farm east of the Cascades where the soil exhausted its 
moisture in a year or two, or had tried to establish a Utopian colony 
somewhere in the isolated parts of Puget Sound—and were choosing the 
sharp edge of radicalism rather than the dull one of bourgeois assimi-
lation. 
T h e war, really, only sorted out more quickly the way people already 
were going. You could get a job in the shipyards in Seattle to avoid the 
logging camps or the draft, and you migh t find in the steady work and 
good wages only worse reminders of the wickedness of capitalism and 
capitalistic warfare. Or you might take the same job and find in it a 
means of escaping economic uncertainty and of joining the middle class. 
You could join a union, the better to radicalize it or the better to seek 
higher wages and lower hours. Both the job and the union could be 
proof that indeed the American system worked, and both could be seen 
as proof that it did not. It might seem the Wobblies were right and that 
the owners only offered pie in the sky bye and bye. Or it might seem that 
it really was the radicals who offered the pie. In any event, the war 
pushed everything closer to the surface, closer to a point where tensions 
could be resolved only in dangerous ways. T h e shipowners and lumber 
barons were in a hurry because the huge profits would not last forever, 
and so they were more amenable to labor 's demands; the prohibitionists 
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were In a hurry because suddenly the whole country seemed eager to go 
dry; the patriots were in a hurry because soldiers were dying in France 
and the world had to be made safe for democracy; the Wobblies were in 
a hurry because their numbers were growing faster than their wildest 
prewar dreams and they felt they had to strike while the iron was hot; the 
would-be bourgeois and the wealthier arrivistes were in a hurry because 
such a chance might not last forever. If the historian feels more sympathy 
for the radicals than any other group, he must not forget that they too 
were caught up in something quite unreal , in that people were becoming 
less able genuinely to comprehend the world around them, and in some-
thing decisive, in that when Seattle emerged from this experience it would 
be a different place. One sympathizes with the radicals precisely because 
they could best unders tand and predict the very hysteria that was over-
taking the city, but they too were its victims. 
In one sense, Seattle was too young to resist. I t had come to its afflu-
ence and large populat ion all within the previous twenty years, and the 
habits and patterns of life were unsettled, especially compared to those in 
older cities farther east. But in another sense Seattle was just a little bit 
too old to resist. By the time war was declared there had been a stiffening 
of the economic joints in the previous two decades, and economic activity 
had become increasingly the domain of a ra ther small number of people 
who had become rich quickly and who of course began to treat the world 
around them as their own; their interest becomes the opposite of civic-
minded. In 1880 and 1890 anything that was done to help Seattle gener-
ally would help these people, but in 1910 these people had their money 
and had grown indifferent to Seattle generally. By the time the war came 
the impulse towards economic diversity, towards municipal ownership of 
the natural monopolies, had faded; Seattle was too old to resist the crisis 
of the struggle which the war had brought sooner than would have 
otherwise happened. 
These two perspectives—Seattle was too young, Seattle was too o l d -
need not be resolved. T h e first is the more distant and long-ranged, the 
view that would seem natura l to anyone who knows about the older cities 
of the world. W h e n one begins to become aware of the centuries-long 
history of London or Rome or Peking, when one sees how much a city can 
rise and fall and recover in the course of hundreds of years, one sees no 
reason why Seattle, founded in 1851 and still a frontier city in many ways, 
should have been strong or independent enough to create its own destiny. 
T h e "interests" grabbed what they could, the city became a center of 
radicalism, the city could not resist the frenzy of the war—of course, says 
the historian of older cities and longer-lived worlds, of course. T h e sec-
ond perspective, on the other hand, is one that can seem attractive only 
to the local historian because he is more aware of changes that come year 
by year and decade by decade. If Seattle was too young to do other than 
become victim to forces that were dominat ing cities and regions far older 
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than it was, nonetheless, says the local historian, it had had a good deal 
more power to resist such forces in 1897 or 1907 than it did in 1917. 
Urban populism in Seattle had been a varied and exciting experience 
around the turn of the century, and that populism had been both de-
pendent upon and instrumental in creating a varied and exciting econ-
omy. But gradually the arteries were beginning to harden—the moneyed 
people were withdrawing, the middle-class was becoming class-conscious, 
the workers were beginning to see everyone else as their potential enemy, 
populism was splintering off in to Prohibi t ion, unionism and radicalism— 
so that the city, instead of being able to look to itself to find means of 
solving its problems and locating its opportunit ies, was beginning to dis-
trust itself and hedge its bets in ways that made it a potential victim of the 
more pervasive blindness th roughou t the country caused by the war. Seen 
this way, Seattle was not too young bu t too old to resist. 
In the fall of 1918 Seattle and America were besieged by rumors of 
armistice and of the Bolshevik revolution. T h e n there was the influenza 
epidemic, which hi t Seattle especially hard—the mortality rate from the 
flu rose to 252 per hundred thousand. Labor was becoming restless, espe-
cially as rumors of uprisings in all the belligerent countries began to be 
received. T h e war was almost over, yet no th ing had improved with the 
prospect of peace. On election day the people of Washington were to vote 
on a referendum on the 1917 bone-dry law, bu t the total vote was barely 
two-fifths of what it had been two years earlier. T h e Drys won, two to 
one, bu t it did not seem to mat ter . Thus , though the Armistice caused 
wild rejoicing, it brought no peace or harmony. Mostly it only signaled to 
the capitalists that it was time to wi thdraw and retrench and to the labor 
unions that they had better work fast to consolidate their wartime gains. 
In his book on the Seattle General Strike, Rober t L. Friedheim offers 
a careful analysis of the make-up of labor unions and conditions at the 
end of the war, and here only a short sketch can be offered. T h e war had 
given impetus to the Wobblies to try to revolutionize the old craft union 
A.F.L. system into their One Big Union , and, as we have seen, it caused 
many working class people to take on characteristics of the middle class. 
These labels are never accurate, and it must be added that many leaders 
of the Seattle Central Labor Council , by no means a back-sliding group, 
were home-owning and God-fearing, no t only themselves sober but also 
Prohibit ionist . By comparison with the Wobblies, men like Harry Ault, 
who edited the Union Record, and James Duncan, president of the Ma-
chinists and chairman of the Central Labor Council, who also taught 
Sunday School, seem trustworthy for what they were, but stodgy. By com-
parison with their A.F.L. counterpar ts elsewhere in the country, however, 
Aul t and Duncan were flaming radicals. Ault 's paper was the only labor 
paper in the country, and after the Daily Call folded, it was in its pages 
that the radicals had their only hope of gaining a hearing. Duncan twice 
cast the only vote in the na t iona l A.F.L. conventions against the re-elec-
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tion of Samuel Gompers as president. Both Aul t and Duncan agreed with 
the Wobblies that there should be some kind of industr ial unionism, 
disagreeing mostly over methods. 
T h e hope and strength of Ault, Duncan, and the other labor leaders 
lay in a very strong local labor organization, one that could, they thought , 
br ing together the hundreds of smaller unions into one uni ted front 
against any Seattle employer or group of employers. The i r weakness, 
which they didn ' t seem to recognize fully, lay in the fact that much of 
their strength was a result of wartime shipbuilding. T h e Metal Trades 
Council, which was a major power in the shipyards, had been tough and 
successful in getting the shipbuilders to pay very h igh wages, and the 
major builder, Skinner and Eddy, was willing to go even higher than the 
others in order to keep a constant supply of workers. Th is led to com-
plaints in the name of equity from Charles Piez of the federal Emergency 
Fleet Corporation, but he had been silenced by the Metal Trades Coun-
cil's agreeing not to strike dur ing wartime. At the time of the Armistice, 
the unions were trying to get all the builders to raise wages to the level of 
those paid by Skinner and Eddy. At this point they were free to strike to 
get what they wanted, but they were also vulnerable simply because the 
government and the shipbuilders could afford such a strike and indeed 
might even welcome it as a means of gett ing a lot of suddenly unwanted 
workers out of town. 
T h e incident that set the almost inevitable conflict in motion involved 
a misdelivered telegram. Piez had wired the Seattle shipbuilders that if 
they gave in to union demands the government would cut off their steel 
allotment. He sent it to the employer group known as the Metal Trades 
Association but the messenger delivered it to the Metal Trades Council, 
and so the unions learned that though Piez had given them an apparently 
free hand to negotiate if they waited unt i l after the war, he had in fact 
double-crossed them by blackmailing the shipbuilders. At this poin t end-
less speculations became possible, and people have gone on speculating 
ever since. Maybe the telegram was not misdelivered, and if it was there 
could be a variety of explanations as to why the shipbuilders wanted the 
unions to know what the government was u p to. Bu t because a good 
many of the conjectures are almost equally reasonable, there is little point 
in going into them all. Whatever h a d happened, on the morn ing of 
January 21, 1919, 35,000 workers struck the shipyards. 
Under more normal conditions that might have been that. T h e ship-
yard-owners would make no move to negotiate because they had no reason 
to do so; the unions would suffer a heavy blow and would have had then 
to decide whether to give in. A good many business people did not care 
much because it seemed to them, despite wild stories about a postwar 
shipping boom, that shipbui lding was not a major par t of Seattle's econ-
omy. But January , 1919 was not at all a normal time, even though all 
that the various parties expected to happen did in fact happen. T h e idea 
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of a general strike was not familiar to many people in Seattle; even the 
Wobblies and those who had done their Marxist homework did not know 
about general strikes as a means of br inging the employing class to its 
knees. Rather , Seattle labor leaders thought first in terms of what was 
called a sympathy strike, and beh ind tha t idea was the feeling that a show 
of force would be helpful. But the more the un ion leaders became con-
vinced that the government, or the shipbuilders, or the newspapers or 
employers in general, had become scared of labor power in Seattle and 
were out to crush it, the more the idea of a general strike seemed attrac-
tive. Conversely, the more anyone tried to say just what such a strike 
would gain, the more people got confused or apprehensive; to lash out 
against a common enemy is always a better way to gain adherents than to 
state a series of clearly-defined goals. T h u s , when David Skinner, who had 
been thought friendly to labor because he pa id high wages, sent a wire to 
Charles Piez saying that most workers were against the strike and that the 
trouble lay with " the radical leaders whose real desire was to disrupt the 
whole organization of society," he provided just the kind of target that a 
mass movement needs to organize. H e l p was offered by the local and 
national press which kept insisting tha t the rank-and-file did not want to 
strike. However, when the largest un ion local in the world, the Boiler-
makers' 104, held a meeting, they voted unanimously in favor of the ship-
yard strike and thereby gave great impetus to unite all Seattle labor in a 
more general strike. 
T h e Boilermakers voted on J anua ry 26. T h e next day a meeting was 
called to sound out opinion, a n d by the t ime the leaders met a number of 
unions, including some of the more conservative ones like the roofers, the 
cooks and the hotel maids, h a d already m e t and had declared themselves 
in favor of a general strike. Some unions of course opposed any breach of 
contract because it violated the very principles on which the unions had 
been organized, bu t soon these unions found themselves surrounded. At 
the meeting on the 27th it was agreed tha t if a majority of the unions 
voted by February 2 to have a general strike, a mass meeting would be 
held to decide what to do. Fr iedheim describes what happened next: 
"Even before the committees could effectively organize themselves, five 
more Seattle unions reported that their members had voted to strike: the 
Structural I ron Workers, the Newsboys, the engineers in the gas plant 
and the publ ic schools, Carpenters ' local 1335, and Barbers' Local 195. 
. . . Night after night, as locals he ld their meetings, votes for a general 
strike cont inued to roll i n . " 6 T h e very names of the unions show that this 
was not a simple class mat te r decided by large numbers of factory hands. 
These unions had been in existence almost as long as the A.F.L. itself, 
and the members of the smaller unions had no obvious reason to ally 
themselves with the large indus t r ia l un ions like the Boilermakers, to say 
noth ing of the I .W.W. After the Carpenters and the Barbers came the 
Jewelers, the Housepainters , the A u t o T r u c k Drivers and the smaller 
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draymen unions. By the 29th only the Gas Workers and the Federal Em-
ployees were opposed. Th i s does not mean that every member of every 
un ion supported the general strike, bu t it is amazing that of 101 unions 
in Seattle the majority of all but two were in favor. 
Anna Louise Strong's account of the next few days is not the fullest, 
bu t i t is the best: 
T h e General Strike Committee, composed of more than 
three hundred delegates from one hundred and ten unions, 
met all day Sunday, February 2, 1919. They faced and dis-
regarded the national officers of craft unions, who were tele-
graphing orders from the East. They met the threats of the 
Seattle Heal th Depar tment to jail drivers of garbage wagons 
if garbage was not removed, by agreeing to permit the col-
lection of "wet garbage only" on special permit under the 
strikers' control. They rejected as strike slogan the mot to 
"We have nothing to lose but our chains and a whole world 
to gain" in favor of "Together W e Win ." For they reasoned 
that they had a great deal to lose—jobs at good wages with 
which they were buying silk shirts, pianos and homes. They 
wanted solidarity bu t not class war. T h e n so little did they 
realize the problems before them that they fixed the strike 
for the following Thursday at 10 A.M. and adjourned to 
meet on Thursday evening after the strike should have 
started, meant ime referring any new problems that might 
arise to a rather hastily elected "Committee of Fifteen." 7 
Anna Strong's j ibe at the lunchpail unions with their pianos and pink 
shirts is a nice if perhaps unfair touch, bu t her sense of the naivete of the 
whole venture is what is most pointed and appealing, because she does 
not seek to exclude herself from the group. She was a middle class aristo-
crat, a theoretician and enthusiast, not a worker, but she genuinely sought 
no more than to give a voice to the workers. 
One reason Anna Strong is so wonderful is that she really tried to say, 
both then and later, what it was the workers were doing. T w o days before 
the strike, she wrote in an editorial for the Union Record: "We are 
undertaking the most tremendous move ever made by labor in this coun-
try, a move that will lead—No One Knows Where! We do not need 
hysteria! W e need the iron march of labor!" 8 She saw even then tha t any 
attempt to say where the whole th ing was going could only lead to the 
loss of this or that element among the workers. Then , looking back, she 
says: "Later, when I was arrested, this editorial was one of the counts 
against me. Its very vagueness saved me. 'No one knows where'—the 
prosecution claimed this threatened anarchy. T h e defense retorted that it 
merely admitted the fact tha t the future is unknown. Neither gave the 
real essence of those words. They appealed to the faith of the pioneer in 
inevitable progress; they stirred the passion of the march to the undis-
covered West. Yet they carefully evaded bat t le ." 9 T h e idea of an undis-
covered West in 1919 seems preposterous unt i l one remembers that fifty 
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years later people are still coming to Seattle for reasons not unlike those 
Anna Strong mentions. In the same way the slogans "No One Knows 
Where" and "Together W e W i n , " precisely because they do appeal to 
something like " the faith of the pioneer in inevitable progress," need to 
be taken seriously in any assessment of what was really happening. As 
politics such slogans are shams, bu t it is important to see the strike as 
more than politics, just as it is impor t an t to see the idea of the 1919 
undiscovered West as not being preposterous. 
I t happened. At 10 A.M. Thursday , February 6, the city stopped. 
Foodlines were set up , and essential services were performed, all at the 
direction of the Committee of Fifteen. But nothing else, and the silence 
that resulted apparently surprised a great many people. Workers had 
been urged to stay home, so they did. T h e streets were left to children 
and dogs, and even they found l i t t le to do because everything else was 
silent. As an initial show of peaceful force the strike could not have been 
more successful. But that was as far as anyone had planned. T h e Wob-
blies had said that after the strike proved successful the working men 
would somehow just assume control of the city's manufacture and services. 
Others felt that an initial show of strength was enough. Most of the 
workers seem not have known what they wanted or expected. Certainly 
the Committee of Fifteen, with the power of the city in its hands, did not 
plan, and the Union Record said almost nothing about the future. 
As a result, when the other side moved, the strikers could do little 
except say that they would or would not cooperate. Mayor Ole Hanson 
slowly began to see he could make his name as a patriotic strike-buster. 
T h e rest of the country seemed alarmed; Anna Louise Strong's editorial 
was interpreted by the good citizens of the city and country as a revolu-
tionary document, and if it was, and if the strikers were revolutionaries, 
then they had to be crushed, no t talked to. T h e National Guard was 
ordered out, and Hanson claimed immediately that that had stemmed the 
revolutionary tide. He then threa tened to declare martial law. T h e labor 
leaders told h im all these moves were fraudulent, designed only to mis-
represent the situation to outsiders. They pointed out that the number of 
arrests in Seattle on the first two days of the strike had dropped to two-
thirds the normal level. But H a n s o n was clearly under pressure to do 
something, so he ignored such facts and sent a formal notice on the eve-
ning of Friday, the 7th, to the Committee of Fifteen: "I hereby notify 
you that unless the sympathy strike is called off by 8 o'clock tomorrow 
morning, February 8, 1919, I will take advantage of the protection offered 
this city by the national government and operate all the essential 
services." Th is notice probably secured Hanson the support of business 
people in Seattle and of good citizens everywhere, but labor's response was 
defiant. No mat ter how anxious many union men were to get back and to 
see if their jobs were still there, they weren't going to be ordered back. 
On Saturday afternoon the Committee of Fifteen offered the 300-man 
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General Strike Committee a resolution declaring the strike a success and 
asking the men to go back to work as of Saturday midnight, bu t the 
moment the leaders began consulting the rank and file they encountered 
opposition to the resolution, and no one went back to work that night. 
But this was to be the last show of strength. No one worked Sunday any-
way, and by Monday cracks were showing in the solid front of labor, 
enough so that the Committee of Fifteen knew that continuing the strike 
could only serve to create factions within the labor movement. O n Mon-
day the Committee urged everyone to stay off the job unt i l Tuesday, and 
to go back to work then. Those at work already on Monday stayed on the 
job, but everyone did go back on Tuesday. T h e strike was over. 
Many people at the t ime had to see the strike as a failure, and Rober t 
Friedheim, in writing the only full t reatment of the strike thirty-five years 
later, agreed with them. T h e men had gained nothing, and Ole Hanson 
made the rounds of the lecture circuit as an expert in crushing Reds. 
Anna Louise Strong wrote: "Shall one blame the yellow leaders who 
sabotaged the strike and wished to end it? Such a charge is easy to make 
—and true. But it is more to the point to ask why it happened that as 
soon as any worker was made a leader he wanted to end that strike. . . . 
T h e strike could produce no leaders willing to keep it going. All of us 
were red in the ranks and yellow as leaders. For we lacked all in tent ion 
of real battle; we expected to drift into power. W e loved the emotion of 
a better world coming, bu t all of our leaders and not a few of the rank 
and file had much to lose in the old w o r l d / ' 1 0 Anna Strong was never a 
great writer, bu t she had a rightness of instinct that makes her testimony 
invaluable. 
I have said earlier that as political slogans "Together W e W i n " and 
"No One Knows W h e r e " were shams, as Ole Hanson proved ra ther 
quickly; after all, had they not been, had the strikers really known what 
they wanted to win, it would have been Hanson's bluff that would have 
been called. But it is not simply as politics that the slogans or the strike 
must be seen. When Anna Strong says the strikers were red in the ranks 
and yellow as leaders, she is reminding us that men like James Duncan 
and Harry Aul t did not feel dispossessed and in need of revolution. They 
had a stake both in their labor movement, and, equally important , in 
Seattle. Seattle was not only where they had come to power, not only 
where they had seen labor become stronger than anywhere else in the 
country, but where they lived, their home. T h a t did not abate their rage 
against the interests or Hanson or David Skinner, bu t it shaped their 
vision of what they had, and therefore of what they might lose. Ault, 
Duncan, Anna Louise Strong and all the others had gained their power 
dur ing the unusual conditions of the war. Ault had worked for years to 
edit a labor daily, and he had gained his dream because the war had 
given him the possibility of a large circulation and of business people 
having to come to his paper to advertise. A revolution could have cost 
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Ault everything he had gained, and as a result he was cautious. T h e war 
had produced, for the working man, visible villains in the form of em-
ployers making huge profits, and it had given him a way of dealing with 
those villains and of appear ing to beat them. But the more the working 
man won, the more he could lose, the more Seattle was where he had 
settled, the more cautious he became as a leader. As I have said earlier, 
Seattle was becoming dur ing the period both more radical and more 
bourgeois, and noth ing shows this more than the success and failure of the 
General Strike. 
For success it was. T h e strikers were wonderful: practical, decent, 
idealistic, scrupulously democratic, able to take the energies of a great 
variety of people and, for a moment at least, to harmonize them. In that 
moment the self-seeking that a fragmented craft union system builds into 
itself, the anger and disillusion that were the war's major results, the 
natura l pettiness of h u m a n beings, all were abrogated. But by its very 
nature it was a local success, and for that reason it was quickly over, be-
cause by its localness it expressed the tie of many people to their place. 
As Friedheim puts it: " T h e strike had been a failure, and they all knew 
it. In the days ahead they were to learn that it was worse than a f a i l u r e -
it was a disaster ." 1 1 T o say this, however, implies that the strike might 
have been a different k ind of success from the success it was and that the 
subsequent fragmentation of the labor movement would not have hap-
pened had the strike not happened. Both implications are false. T h e war 
gave the radicals and the labor movement false hopes just as it was giving 
many of them homes in Seattle. Anna Louise Strong says that the heyday 
of the Central Labor Council was in the period when people coming in 
from elsewhere made great speeches. But the longer those speakers stayed 
the less revolutionary they became, and when the wartime boom was over 
they also became less powerful. 
I t must be remembered, too, that it was not only the war that had led 
labor to believe that this city was a place whose continued growth was 
assured. In the decade before the war Seattle was booming, though it is 
easy to see now that it was a boom based more on earlier economic diversity 
and stability than on anything happening during that decade to insure 
further growth. Money was becoming more concentrated, and as it did it 
became more cautious, more content in collecting the blue chips that 
could be extracted from lumber and the railroads. T h e economy of 
Seattle was in much worse shape in 1914 than could have been seen at the 
time by any bu t the most perceptive, and when, on top of that, the war 
gave the area another huge boost, laboring people were misled into think-
ing that Seattle had unl imited possibilities for everyone. 
So the General Strike really is a demonstration of the kind of hold the 
past can have on people. Even the Wobblies took the wild wartime de-
mands for productivity as a sign that the workers were coming into their 
own. But even as the war was going on the I .W.W. was being decimated 
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by the execution or conviction of its greatest leaders, and the movement 
was not great enough to be able to afford such losses. Labor generally had 
to begin to find out all over again what its resources were, and in the 
ensuing years it was forced to learn that what Seattle's crisis had obscured 
was that the prewar and wart ime booms were not creating conditions for 
further growth. In many ways the depression began here not in 1929, 
but in 1919. 
In that year one famous m a n visited Seattle, and another who had not 
yet achieved fame re turned to Seattle after having done a hitch in the 
Navy. T h e visitor was Woodrow Wilson, making his whirlwind tour of 
the country in an effort to gain mass support for the League of Nations, 
coming to Seattle not long before he was paralyzed by a stroke on the 
train between Pueblo and Wichi ta . J o h n Dos Passos gives a small picture 
of Wilson's reception in Seattle: " In Seattle the wobblies whose leaders 
were in jail, in Seattle the wobblies whose leaders had been lynched, 
who 'd been shot down like dogs, in Seattle the wobblies lined four blocks 
as Wilson passed, stood silent with their arms folded, staring at the great 
liberal as he was hurr ied past in his car, huddled in his overcoat, haggard 
with fatigue, one side of his face twitching. T h e m e n in overalls, the 
workingstiffs let h im pass in silence after all the other blocks of hand-
clapping and patriotic cheers ." 1 2 Resolute, r ighteous, in most respects 
right, faces turned to the past, the Wobblies died, crushed as much by 
peace as by war. T h a t was one Seattle in 1919. 
T h e other was the Seattle seen by Dave Beck when he came home from 
the Navy, and he saw anarchy, idealism, disillusion: "Beck thought the 
strike had been wrong, criminally wrong; it had been impetuous, i t had 
been pointless; it brought disrepute to Labor and had won nothing. H e 
was disgusted with the idealists who had dreamed it up . He would no 
longer answer when the Wobblies greeted h i m as a 'fellow worker . ' 1 3 
Resolute, righteous, in some respects right, face tu rned to the future, Dave 
Beck went back to driving truck, soliciting business for his boss, organ-
izing the laundry teamsters. T h a t was another Seattle in 1919, a city cut 
smaller, defeated, grim, unaware of what had happened and so of where 
to go, ready for the ministrations of Dave Beck. 
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